

## Message Text

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ACTION IO-14

INFO OCT-01 AF-10 EUR-12 ISO-00 ARA-10 EA-10 NEA-10  
DHA-05 AID-05 IGA-02 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-01  
INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15  
USIE-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00 SSO-00 COME-00 EB-08  
FRB-03 TRSE-00 XMB-02 OPIC-03 LAB-04 SIL-01  
OMB-01 /136 W

-----049663 102015Z/72

O 101905Z SEP 77

FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5287  
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM  
AMEMBASSY LAGOS  
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA  
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY MAPUTO  
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE  
AMCONSUL CAPETOWN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 USUN 2968

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PORG, SF, WA  
SUBJECT: NAMIBIA: CONTACT GROUP MEETING OF SEPTEMBER 9

1. SUMMARY: THE CONTACT GROUP MET WITH COMMISSIONER FOR NAMIBIA MARTTI AHTISAARI AND HIS TANZANIAN DEPUTY BERNARD MUGANDA ON SEPTEMBER 9, INTER ALIA, TO REVIEW THE SECRETARIAT'S CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR THE UN ROLE IN NAMIBIA. THE FIVE CONCLUDED THAT UN PLANNING THUS FAR, ALTHOUGH STILL AT AN EARLY STAGE AND SUBJECT TO CHANGE, WAS GENERALLY COMPATIBLE WITH WESTERN EFFORTS TO FIND A MIDDLE GROUND SOLUTION TO THE NAMIBIAN PROBLEM. THE MEETING PROVIDED AN CONFIDENTIAL

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OPPORTUNITY TO POINT OUT POTENTIAL TROUBLE SPOTS TO AHTISAARI, WHICH HE READILY AGREED TO KEEP UNDER REVIEW. AHTISAARI DECLINED TO LEAVE COPIES OF HIS PLAN WITH THE FIVE.  
END SUMMARY.

2. AHTISAARI STRONGLY EMPHASIZED THAT THE 19-PAGE PLAN HE HAD BROUGHT TO THE MEETING REPRESENTED HIS PRELIMINARY

VIEW ONLY AND HAD NOT BEEN ENDORSED BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL. HE SAID THAT MUCH OF THE PLANNING WAS STILL TENTATIVE AND COULD CHANGE AS NEW DATA WERE OBTAINED. IN PARTICULAR, ESTIMATES OF THE NUMBER OF UN PERSONNEL REQUIRED FOR THE JOB AND THE ESTIMATED COST OF THE UN PRESENCE COULD BE AFFECTED IN THIS WAY. MOREOVER, IMPORTANT PARTS OF THE PLAN, SUCH AS THE MACHINERY TO DEAL WITH THE RELEASE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS, HAD TO BE LEFT UNSETTLED UNTIL MORE COMMON GROUND WAS IDENTIFIED BETWEEN SWAPO AND THE SAG. FINALLY, HE POINTED OUT THAT THE PLAN CONCENTRATED ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY ON THE CIVILIAN SIDE OF THE UN PRESENCE AND LEFT THE MILITARY SIDE, WHICH WAS MORE COMPLICATED, OPEN FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION.

3. NEVERTHELESS, AHTISAARI BELIEVED THAT HE WAS FAR ENOUGH ALONG WITH THE PLANNING PROCESS TO BE ABLE TO PRESENT A PLANNING DOCUMENT FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL A DAY OR TWO AFTER THE LATTER RETURNED TO NEW YORK ON SEPTEMBER 13. HE ALSO INTENDS TO RECOMMEND TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL THAT HE DISCUSS THE BROAD OUTLINES OF THE PLANNING DOCUMENT WITH SWAPO'S RESIDENT REPRESENTATIVE IN NEW YORK, THEO-BEN GURIRAB. GURIRAB WILL BE LEAVING NEW YORK AROUND MID-SEPTEMBER TO ATTEND A MEETING OF THE SWAPO CENTRAL COMMITTEE, AND IT IS AHTISAARI'S IDEA TO KEEP SWAPO INFORMED OF THE STATE OF UN CONTINGENCY PLANNING THROUGH GURIRAB. AHTISAARI  
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ASSURED THE FIVE, AFTER RESERVATIONS WERE EXPRESSED BY THE BRITISH, AMONG OTHERS, ABOUT THE DANGERS OF APPEARING TO COMMIT THE UN TO PLANNING CONCEPTIONS AND DETAILS WHICH MIGHT PROVE TO BE PREMATURE, THAT HE INTENDED TO BRIEF SWAPO ONLY ON THE BROAD OUTLINES OF THE PLAN AND NOT THE DETAILED.

4. THE PLAN ADHERES CLOSELY TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 385, WITH PROVISION FOR MACHINERY TO MEET THE FOLLOWING PRIORITIES: (A) SUPERVISION AND CONTROL OF ELECTIONS; (B) MAINTAINING THE PEACE AND PUBLIC ORDER (THE SPHERE OF A PEACEKEEPING FORCE); (C) ABOLITION OF RACIALLY DISCRIMINATORY AND POLITICALLY REPRESSIVE LAWS; AND (D) ABOLITION OF ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES INCONSISTENT WITH THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS. SIGNIFICANTLY, IT RECOGNIZES THE UN'S NEED FOR SOUTH AFRICAN COOPERATION DURING THE TRANSITION.

5. THE PLAN ENVISAGES A UN STAFF OF ABOUT 800 CIVILIAN EXPATRIATE AND LOCAL PERSONNEL, NOT INCLUDING ELECTORAL OFFICIALS WHO WOULD BE NEEDED ONLY AT REGISTRATION AND ELECTION TIME. THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE'S WINDHOEK

HEADQUARTERS, WITH A STAFF OF 223, WOULD CONSIST OF THE OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE (6), AN ELECTION SUPERVISORY UNIT (11), A LEGAL ADVISORY UNIT (11), A DEVELOPMENT ADVISORY UNIT (15), A MILITARY ADVISORY UNIT (TO BE DETERMINED), A POLICE ADVISORY UNIT (6), PLUS UNHCR AND SUPPORT PERSONNEL. (THE DEVELOPMENT ADVISORY UNIT WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR MONITORING SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND OTHER FUNCTIONS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN ADMINISTRATION AND PROVIDING EXPERTISE NEEDED BY THE FUTURE NAMIBIAN GOVERNMENT.) SOMETHING OVER 500 MORE UN PERSONNEL WOULD BE STATIONED OUTSIDE WINDHOEK.

6. AHTISAARI ESTIMATED THE COST OF UN CIVILIAN OPERATIONS, WITH EVERYTHING IMPORTED AND INCLUDING CARS,  
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TRUCKS, RENTAL OF OFFICE SPACE, AIRLINE TICKETS, SHIPPING, ETC., AT APPROXIMATELY \$40 MILLION. HE WOULD NOT PREDICT WITH ANY CERTAINTY AT THIS TIME HOW LARGE A PEACEKEEPING FORCE WOULD BE NEEDED, BUT HE SUGGESTED A MAXIMUM FIGURE OF 5000-7000 BLUE HELMETS, COSTING AN ADDITIONAL \$20 MILLION PER MONTH. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THESE FIGURES WERE ON THE HIGH SIDE.

7. FINALLY, AHTISAARI SAID THAT HE HAD HIRED A FINNISH CONSULTANT TO DO A SIX-MONTH STUDY OF THE ROLE OF THE COUNCIL FOR NAMIBIA DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PROCESS. HE SAID HE INTENDED THAT ROLE TO BE ACTIVE AND VISIBLE BUT COULD NOT BE ANY MORE SPECIFIC AT THIS TIME BECAUSE THE CONSULTANT HAD ONLY JUST ENTERED ON THE JOB.

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AMCONSUL CAPETOWN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 USUN 2968

8. THE WESTERN FIVE POINTED OUT A NUMBER OF POTENTIAL TROUBLE SPOTS TO AHTISAARI AND WERE PLEASED WITH HIS READY AGREEMENT TO KEEP THESE AREAS UNDER REVIEW. AMBASSADOR MCHENRY POINTED OUT THAT THE PLAN FAILED TO BRING OUT CLEARLY ENOUGH THE ADMINISTRATOR GENERAL'S DAY-TO-DAY RESPONSIBILITY FOR ADMINISTRATION DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. AS WRITTEN, THE PLAN COULD BE MISINTERPRETED BY SOUTH AFRICA AND OTHERS AS IMPLYING DIRECT ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE. THIS WAS NOT INTENDED BY THE WESTERN FIVE OR, MCHENRY BELIEVED, BY AHTISAARI. MCHENRY URGED AHTISAARI TO REDRAFT THE PLAN TO CLARIFY THE RELATION-  
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SHIP BETWEEN THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AND THE ADMINISTRATOR GENERAL.

9. MCHENRY AND OTHERS POINTED OUT THAT THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE COUNCIL FOR NAMIBIA WAS AN EXTREMELY SENSITIVE ISSUE BECAUSE IT WAS IN THE COUNCIL THAT THE LEGAL CHASM BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND THE UN WAS SHARPEST. MCHENRY SAID THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT ANY ROLE FOR THE COUNCIL FOR NAMIBIA BE ADVISORY AND NOT INSTITUTIONAL. AHTISAARI REPLIED THAT HE HAD NO OBJECTION TO AN ADVISORY ROLE AND LAUGHINGLY ASSURED THE FIVE THAT HE HAD NO INTENTION OF INVITING THE COUNCIL FOR NAMIBIA TO MOVE TO WINDHOEK.

10. MCHENRY ALSO URGED AHTISAARI TO KEEP COSTS DOWN, RELYING TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE ON SOUTH AFRICAN LOGISTICAL SUPPORT AND LOCAL ACQUISITION OF MATERIALS AND EQUIPMENT. EVEN THEN, HE SAID, COSTS WOULD BE VERY HIGH. AHTISAARI REPLIED THAT HE COULD NOT RELY TOO

MUCH ON SOUTH AFRICAN LOGISTICAL SUPPORT WITHOUT LOSING THE CONFIDENCE OF SWAPO BUT HE TOOK THE POINT ABOUT ECONOMY.

11. THERE WAS ALSO CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION ABOUT THE MECHANISM OF DECIDING THE STATUS OF POLITICAL PRISONERS, WHICH AHTISAARI SAID MUST BE A FUNCTION OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE'S STAFF AND MUST EXCLUDE SOUTH AFRICANS. MCHENRY REITERATED THE NEED TO RETAIN SOME SOUTH AFRICAN PARTICIPATION IN THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS IN ORDER TO DEMONSTRATE THE INTERLOCKING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UN AND SOUTH AFRICA WHICH WAS A THE HEART OF THE WESTERN INITIATIVE. IF AN INDEPENDENT PANEL WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO SWAPO, HE SUGGESTED THAT THE

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SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE MIGHT APPOINT TWO SOUTH AFRICANS TO HIS LEGAL ADVISORY UNIT.

12. MENTION WAS ALSO MADE OF AHTISAARI'S INCLUSION OF WALVIS BAY DISTRICT IN THE PLAN, OBVIOUSLY A CONTROVERSIAL ELEMENT.

13. COMMENT: THE WESTERN FIVE WERE SATISFIED THAT AHTISAARI'S CONTINGENCY PLANS WERE GENERALLY COMPATIBLE WITH WESTERN EFFORTS TO FIND A MIDDLE GROUND SOLUTION TO THE NAMIBIAN PROBLEM, AND THEY WERE PLEASED THAT AHTISAARI APPEARED TO BE SENSITIVE TO THE NEED TO CONTINUE WORKING ALONG PARALLEL LINES.

LEONARD

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## Message Attributes

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**Review Markings:**  
Margaret P. Grafeld  
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22 May 2009  
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